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I. INTRODUCTION 
The False Claims Act (“FCA”) has been around since the days of 
President Lincoln.1  Gone are the days since the American Civil War 
when the Act was first dubbed Lincoln Law.2  Compared to the early 
years of the law when it had a very limited impact, it is now the 
government’s leading enforcement tool to bring civil causes of action 
against contractors in the financial, defense, for-profit education, and the 
health care industry.3  The lion’s share of the most significant FCA 
settlements comes from the health care and pharmaceutical arenas.4  
Crippling financial penalties can apply under the FCA in its most 
common application, for example, when someone knowingly presents or 
causes to be presented a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval 
to the federal government.5 
With FCA cases on the rise and penalties in the billions, circuit court 
precedent and the definitions of “falsity” and “materiality” have become 
particularly relevant in FCA jurisprudence.  False claims cases can take 
on many different forms.6  When a contractor certifies compliance with 
the laws, regulations, or contract terms in a claim for payment from the 
government, those certifications are vital.  The certification informs the 
government, or misleads it, about the goods or services the contractor 
provided.  It also represents compliance with the laws, regulations, and 
contract terms, which have a “natural tendency to influence, or be capable 
 
 1  31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006); see generally Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Reining in 
Lincoln’s Law: A Call to Limit the Implied Certification Theory of Liability Under the False 
Claims Act, 101 CAL. L. REV. 227, 236-41 (2013) (detailing how the theory has developed 
over the years and its implications).   
 2  Patricia Meador, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic Evolves into A 
Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 483 (1998) (stating that, in the late nineties and now, 
it is used increasingly in the health care sphere in an effort to combat fraud, and that the health 
care industry faces a significant threat by the stiff penalties and damage provisions found in 
the False Claims Act) (explaining how the FCA is no longer a “relic of the civil war”).  
 3  By 2014, hundreds of former pharmaceutical sales reps turned whistleblowers filed 
cases against manufacturers for off-label promotion of their drugs. See Mikes v. Straus, 274 
F.3d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Chesbrough v. VPA. P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 467 (6th Cir. 
2011) (“The FCA reaches claims submitted by health-care providers to Medicare and 
Medicaid—indeed, one of its primary uses has been to combat fraud in the health-care field.”). 
 4  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion 
From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2016.  
 5  § 3729(a)(1)(A); see also Martin, supra note 1, at 234 (explaining how this section of 
the FCA is the most litigated). 
 6  S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 9, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5274 (“A false claim 
may take many forms, the most common being a claim for goods or services not provided, 
or provided in violation of contract terms, specification, statute, or regulation.”) (emphasis 
added). 
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of influencing” the government’s payment decision.7 
When it comes to implied false certifications under the FCA, there 
are two kinds: express and implied.8  An express false certification occurs 
when a contractor expressly certified that it was compliant with a law, 
contract term, or regulation in a claim for federal funds from the 
government.9  An implied false certification fails to disclose in a request 
for payment noncompliance with material legal requirements in the 
statutes, regulations, or contract, thereby rendering the claim a 
misrepresentation and “false or fraudulent” under § 3729(a)(1)(A).10  
Before the highly-anticipated and unanimous Supreme Court decision in 
United Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, the federal 
circuit courts were sharply divided on implied false certification theory, 
when to apply it, and which standard to apply.11 
Manufacturers, providers, and others in the health care industry that 
submit reimbursements for federal funds faced greater risk during the 
split in authority in the appellate courts depending on where the 
government or qui tam relators filed.  Then, on June 16, 2016, the 
Supreme Court in Escobar resolved the circuit split.12  The future of FCA 
cases based on an implied false certification theory rested on the Escobar 
decision.  It was the Court’s opportunity to send a death knell to implied 
false certification theory, but instead, it kept it alive.  Universal Health 
lost handily.  The Escobar Court remanded the case to the First Circuit to 
determine whether the noncompliance was material under the Court’s 
newly articulated standard.13  The Escobar Court also held that implied 
certification theory could be a basis for liability where at least two 
conditions are met: (1) the claim for payment makes specific 
representations about the goods or services provided; and (2) the party’s 
 
 7  § 3729(b)(4). 
 8  United States v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 635 (4th Cir. 2015) (“The use of 
‘judicially created formal categories’ for false claims is of ‘relatively recent vintage,’ and 
rigid use of such labels can ‘do more to obscure than clarify’ the scope of the FCA.”) (citing 
United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 385 (1st Cir. 
2011). 
 9  United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., 659 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011); 
see § 3729(a)(2) (stating when express certification occurs as a result of a false statement 
made in order to receive payment for a false claim).  
 10  Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (2016). 
 11  See Martin, supra note 1, at 241 (outlining the four positions held by the various 
circuits); see also Steven M. Kaufman, Navigating the Circuit Split on Implied False 
Certification, LAW360 (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/719758/navigating 
-the-circuit-split-on-implied-false-certification. 
 12  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1989 (discussing the need for the Court to grant certiorari to 
resolve the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals over the validity and scope of the 
implied false certification theory of liability). 
 13  Id. at 2004. 
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failure to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or 
contractual requirements makes those representations misleading half-
truths.14  The court focused on the requirement that the alleged falsity be 
“material” to the government’s decision to pay the claim and urged lower 
courts to limit the reach of implied certification “through strict 
enforcement of the Act’s materiality and scienter requirements.”15  The 
First Circuit found that the false certifications submitted by Universal 
Health, which falsely represented compliance with Medicare’s 
regulations governing the treating professionals’ qualifications and 
licensing requirements, were material to the government’s decision to 
pay.16  Universal Health lost, but future qui tam cases brought under the 
theory may be harder to prove as courts are heeding the Escobar mandate 
that the materiality test be “rigorous” and “demanding.”17 
This note takes the position that the winner of Escobar is yet to be 
determined.  So far, both defendants and relators are seeing positive signs 
in the courts’ enforcement of Escobar’s materiality standard.  It is 
arguable that Escobar’s expansive litigation for putative false-claim 
cases in the health care industry could ensure relators survive summary 
judgment if they are able to allege sufficient facts during the pleading 
stage.  It is plausible that defendants will have more motivation to settle 
FCA cases out of concern over substantial discovery requests and costly 
litigation.  Conversely, by federal courts enforcing Escobar’s 
“demanding” materiality standard, some defendants have found fertile 
ground for showing that relators have not made plausible claims with 
particularity on how the alleged conduct rises to the level of materiality.18 
Part II of this note will discuss the evolution of the theory, the rise 
of FCA cases and the motivation behind that rise over the past five 
decades, and why false implied certification theory became the most 
litigated provision of the Act.  Part III will look at the pre-Escobar circuit 
split and the various positions taken by the courts during this period.  Part 
IV will discuss Escobar and the materiality standard emphasized by the 
Supreme Court.  Part V will evaluate what effect, if any, Escobar’s 
materiality standard would have on pre-Escobar decisions and whether 
Escobar makes it more or less difficult for relators to bring dismissal-
proof complaints.  Part V will also review the wide range in interpretation 
 
 14  Id.  
 15  Id. at 1994. 
 16  United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal. Health Servs., 842 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 
2016). 
 17  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003. 
 18  See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 334 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(explaining the alleged billing failures were not material in light of the government’s 
acceptance of the reports). 
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of “materiality” in the federal circuit courts. 
While the Supreme Court provided examples of material violations, 
because the tests must be conducted on a case-by-case basis, the post-
Escobar landscape has already splintered in different directions in the 
definition of “specific misrepresentation” and as to which factors carry 
the most weight in determining whether the half-truth affected the 
government’s decision-making process. 
II. THE THEORY AND THE MONEY 
FCA civil claims resulted in $26.4 billion in judgments and 
settlements for the Treasury since 2009, with half of that figure recovered 
in 2015 alone.19  Concerned industry stakeholders scrambled to adjust to 
stringent legislation and its steep penalties, while taxpayers feared that 
fraud and abuse in the health care industry would continue to drive up 
drug costs to the determent of elderly and low-income populations.  The 
money collected in these settlements and judgments are, in part, made 
possible by the Act’s qui tam provision, which allows cases to be filed by 
whistleblowers.  The government can step into such cases, or, if pursued 
solely by the relators, the whistleblowers are eligible for approximately 
twenty-five to thirty percent of the recovery.20  The pressure is mounting 
on industry stakeholders largely because entities must spend more time 
than ever before to ensure that they have the necessary safeguards in place 
to prevent crippling settlements and judgments.21  Business leaders find 
themselves appealing to their boards of directors to invest in compliance 
and data mining programs and auditing personnel in order to establish 
risk management as a top priority.22 
A. Motivation behind the Rise 
The intent, or scienter, requirement behind the Act distinguishes it 
from other antifraud statutes like the Stark Law, a strict liability federal 
 
 19  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers over $3.5 Billion 
From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa 
/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-35-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2015. 
 20  31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(2) (Westlaw through P.L. 115-61). 
 21  See United States ex rel. Lam v. Tenet Healthcare Corp 481 F. Supp. 2d 689, 689 
(W.D. Tex. 2007). 
 22  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. & AM. 
HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, GUIDE TO CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE: A RESOURCE FOR HEALTH CARE BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, https://oig.hhs.gov/ 
fraud/docs/complianceguidance/040203CorpRespRsceGuide.pdf  (last visited Dec. 27, 2017) 
(“However, once presented (through the compliance program or otherwise) with information 
that causes (or should cause) concerns to be aroused, the director is then obligated to make 
further inquiry until such time as his/her concerns are satisfactorily addressed and favorably 
resolved.”). 
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law.23  Even more powerful than Stark, the FCA is one of the strongest 
antifraud statutes.24  Before the 1963 amendment, the qui tam provisions 
of the FCA were essentially emasculated as the relators were considered 
interferences with enforcement discretion.25  Yet, last year, $2.8 billion 
of the $3.5 billion recovered was a result of cases brought by qui tam 
relators.26  Whistleblowers are incentivized to bring suit against 
government contractors.27  By the mid-1990s, health care fraud was 
second to violent crime in terms of important initiatives pursued by the 
attorney general.28 
B. The Theory 
A contractor who, in a request for payment, fails to disclose 
noncompliance with material legal requirements of a statute, regulation, 
or contract can be subjected to an FCA cause of action pursuant to the 
implied false certification theory.29  The failure to disclose material 
violations is a misrepresentation, which renders the claim false.30  False 
claims are broadly defined under the FCA.  A legally false FCA claim, 
 
 23  42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Westlaw through P.L. 115-61); see also U.S. ex rel. Drakeford 
v. Tuomey Healthcare Sys., 675 F.3d 394, 396 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Lisa Schencker, $237 
Million Tuomey Judgment Upheld by Federal Appeals Court, MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM 
(July 2, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150702/NEWS/150709975 (“It 
seems as if, even for well-intentioned health care providers, the Stark law has become a booby 
trap rigged with strict liability and potentially ruinous exposure – especially when coupled 
with the False Claims Act.”). 
 24  See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269 
(commenting that the False Claims Act is one of the more effective ways to combat). 
 25  If the government chooses not to intervene, the relator can proceed with the action 
providing the court can permit the government to intervene later.  See Martin, supra note 1, 
at 237.  In light of this sentiment, Congress amended the Act in 1943 to thwart qui tam actions 
by creating a government-knowledge bar.  This meant qui tam relators could not bring suit if 
the federal government already knew of the violation and the amendments decreased the 
payout to relators.  See United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. CIV.A. 96-
11651PBS, 2003 WL 22048255, at *19-20 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003).  Relators are private 
persons who can bring suit in the name of the government.  The court failed to consider the 
issue, however, because it was raised by the government, and the government had not 
intervened as a party in the case. 
 26  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers over $3.5 Billion 
From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa 
/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-35-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2015. 
 27  Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the 
American Bar Association’s Ninth National Institute on the Civil False Claims Act and Qui 
Tam Enforcement (June 7, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/civil/speeches/2012/civ-
speech-1206071.html. 
 28  Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of 
Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 134 (2001). 
 29  Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1995 (2016). 
 30  Id. 
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either express or implied, is based on a “false certification” theory of 
liability.31  Federal appellate courts have generally recognized false 
certification theory, with false implied certification being one way for the 
government to prove falsity. 
Implied false certification theory of liability is predicated on “the 
notion that the act of submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies 
compliance with governing federal rules that are a precondition to 
payment.”32  
A payment request is treated as an implied certification of 
compliance with the relevant statutes, regulations, and contract 
requirements in the absence of an express certification.33  Implied false 
certification theory is not supported by evidence that the claimant made 
an express false statement.34  Each time a claimant requests payment of 
funds and fails to disclose material contractual, statutory, and regulatory 
violations, liability can attach even though they did not make any 
affirmative misstatements.35  If the certification in question is knowingly 
false when made, it does not matter whether it is an assertion or 
omission—they impliedly, falsely certified compliance with the 
underlying conditions of payment.36  Implied false certification is 
significantly more expansive than express certification and has caused 
uncertainty among interested stakeholders for the past twenty years over 
when the theory could serve as a basis for liability under the False Claims 
Act.37 
III. THE THEORY AND ITS CASES PRE-ESCOBAR 
Courts generally followed either a narrow application of the implied 
false certification theory, which was established by the Second Circuit in 
Mikes v. Straus and permitted the theory to attach only where the 
underlying statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff 
relies expressly states the provider must comply in order to be paid; or a 
 
 31  See Martin, supra at note 1, at 244. 
 32  Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001) abrogated by Universal Health 
Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1989 (2016). 
 33  U.S. ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 305 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 34  Id. at 239.  
 35  Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 36  Id.  
 37  U.S. ex rel. Wilkins, 659 F.3d 295 at 305 (“There is a more expansive version of the 
express false certification theory called ‘implied false certification’ liability which attaches 
when a claimant seeks and makes a claim for payment from the Government without 
disclosing that it violated regulations that affected its eligibility for payment.  Thus, an 
implied false certification theory of liability is premised ‘on the notion that the act of 
submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance with governing federal rules 
that are a precondition to payment.’”) (citing Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699). 
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broader rule, developed by the First Circuit in United States ex rel. 
Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, which finds liability regardless of 
whether the condition for payment is expressly stated.38  The Mikes court 
rejected the relator’s claims because compliance with the cited Medicare 
condition was not expressly stated in the statute as a condition of 
payment.39  However, in Blackstone, the court concluded that the 
language of the False Claims Act wholly failed to support the express 
condition-of-payment requirement that the Second Circuit established in 
Mikes. 
A. “Express Condition of Payment” Position by Mikes Court 
Of the courts that have upheld liability under the implied false 
certification theory, Mikes v. Straus is the seminal “express condition of 
payment” requirement case.40  When the defendant physicians in a 
partnership that specialized in oncology fired their board-certified 
pulmonologist, they claimed they did so because she had trouble securing 
privileges in surrounding hospitals.41  The pulmonologist-turned-relator, 
Dr. Patricia Mikes, claimed in her qui tam filing against the defendants 
that she was fired after she questioned the medical practices of the 
defendants—specifically, Mikes alleged the defendant physicians’ 
operation of the spirometry tests failed to meet guidelines set forth by the 
American Thoracic Society.42  She alleged that they employed unskilled 
assistants in the administration of spirometry testing and produced false 
data.43  Because of the administration’s failure to properly calibrate the 
spirometer daily, Mikes insisted the defendants submitted claims based 
on HCFA-1500 forms for the spirometry tests that did not comply with 
ATS guidelines.44  As a result, Mikes argued the defendants made an 
implied false certification.45  Mikes rested her assertion on the qualitative 
standard of care mandate of the Social Security Act.46 
 
 38  Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) abrogated by Universal Health 
Servs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1989 (2016); cf. U.S. ex rel. Hutcheson v. 
Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 385 (1st Cir. 2011).  
 39  Mikes, 274 F.3d at 702 (“Since § 1320c-5(a) does not expressly condition payment on 
compliance with its terms, defendants’ certifications on the HCFA-1500 forms are not legally 
false. Consequently, defendants did not submit impliedly false claims by requesting 
reimbursement for spirometry tests that allegedly were not performed according to the 
recognized standards of health care.”). 
 40  Mikes introduced the express condition of payment standard.  Id. at 697. 
 41  Id. at 692. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. at 693. 
 44  Id. at 694-95. 
 45  Mikes, 274 F.3d at 701.  
 46  Id. at 694. 
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The Mikes court disagreed with the relator and refused to apply the 
theory because the compliance was not expressly stated in the statute as 
a condition of payment.47  The court pointed to the section of the 
Medicare statute, which established conditions of participation.48  This 
section is concerned with the quality of the care and the service that “will 
be of a quality which meets professionally recognized standards of health 
care.”49  Noncompliance with this section is a violation of conditions of 
participation, not a condition for reimbursement.50  A separate section 
governed the medical necessity of a given procedure and its 
quality.51  This section contains an express condition of payment that 
requires “no payment may be made” unless a particular item or service 
be “reasonable and necessary.”52  The court decided that the defendants’ 
performance of the spirometry tests and the submission of the HCFA-
1500 form did not point to “medical necessity.”53  Nor is the submission 
of the forms an attestation of the providers’ compliance with both of those 
provisions.54 
Instead, the court stated that the “requirement that a service be 
reasonable and necessary generally pertains to the selection of the 
particular procedure and not to its performance.”55  The court’s reasoning 
was, in part, an affirmation of the court’s anxiety about the FCA being 
used in a way that encroaches on principles enshrined by federalism and 
safety interests controlled by local governments.56  The Third, Sixth, and 
 
 47  Id. at 702 (“Since § 1320c-5(a) does not expressly condition payment on compliance 
with its terms, defendants’ certifications on the HCFA-1500 forms are not legally false. 
Consequently, defendants did not submit impliedly false claims by requesting reimbursement 
for spirometry tests that allegedly were not performed according to the recognized standards 
of health care.”). 
 48  Id. at 701-02 (The structure of the statute further informs us that § 1320c-5(a) 
establishes conditions of participation, rather than prerequisites to receiving reimbursement.).  
“[§ 1395y(a)(1)(A)] contains an express condition of payment—that is, ‘no payment may be 
made’—it explicitly links each Medicare payment to the requirement that the particular item 
or service be “reasonable and necessary.”  Id. at 700.  
 49  Id. at 700-01. 
 50  The court viewed 1320c-5(a) as a prospective mandate for a provider determining 
eligibility to participate in the Medicare program.  Id. at 701 (explaining § 1320c-5(a) 
provides that it shall be the obligation of the practitioner who provides a medical service for 
which payment may be made to assure compliance). 
 51  Mikes, 274 F.3d at 701. 
 52  Id. 
 53  Id. at 700. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. at 699 (“Moreover, a limited application of implied certification in the health care 
field reconciles, on the one hand, the need to enforce the Medicare statute with, on the other 
hand, the active role actors outside the federal government play in assuring that appropriate 
standards of medical care are met.  Interests of federalism counsel that  ‘the regulation of 
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Tenth Circuits followed the Mikes court.57 
B. “Material to the Government’s Decision to Pay” Position by 
Blackstone Court 
In a marked turn away from the Second Circuit’s decision in Mikes, 
the First Circuit established the “material to the government’s decision to 
pay” standard.58  When the First Circuit decided Blackstone, the Supreme 
Court had not decided the question of whether a condition must be 
expressly stated in order for a claim to be actionable.59  The First Circuit 
looked to the intent of the FCA in rejecting the Mikes court’s position.60 
In Blackstone, the relator, a former employee of a medical device 
manufacturer, filed a qui tam action alleging that Blackstone violated the 
Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”) by inducing physicians to use its medical 
devices in spinal surgeries.61  The relator also argued that the defendant 
knowingly caused physicians and hospitals to present payment claims 
that included material misrepresentations.62  The cost reports that the 
hospitals had submitted certified compliance with “the laws and 
regulations regarding the provisions of health care services[.]”63  The 
innocent third parties, in this case, the hospitals, but not doctors, were 
required to submit a Provider Agreement and Hospital Cost Report 
certifying their compliance with Medicare law.64  Additionally, to 
establish eligibility to receive reimbursement from Medicare, the 
hospitals were required to submit a Hospital Cost Report along with their 
claims for reimbursement.65  On appeal, the First Circuit found that the 
 
health and safety matters is primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern.’” (citing 
Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)). 
 57  See Martin, supra note 1, at 245. 
 58  U.S. ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 381-82 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 59  Id. at 387 (“Neither party argues that this court or the Supreme Court has expressly 
spoken to whether a precondition of payment must be explicitly stated in a statute or 
regulation to give rise to a false or fraudulent claim.”). 
 60  Id. (“[T]he text of the FCA does not exhibit an intent to limit liability in this fashion.”). 
 61  Id. at 379-81. 
 62  Id. at 378. 
 63  Id. at 381-82 (“Misrepresentation or falsification of any information contained in this 
cost report may be punishable by criminal, civil and administrative action, fine and/or 
imprisonment under federal law. Furthermore, if services identified in this report [were] 
provided or procured through the payment directly or indirectly of a kickback or where 
otherwise illegal, criminal, civil and administrative action, fines and/or imprisonment may 
result.  The signatory of the Hospital Cost Report must certify . . . I further certify that I am 
familiar with the laws and regulations regarding the provisions of health care services, and 
that the services identified in this cost report were provided in compliance with such laws and 
regulations.”). 
 64  Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d at 381.  
 65  Id. at 381. 
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lower court erred in applying the express condition of payment 
standard.66 
The First Circuit dispensed with “judicially created categories” of 
express or implied certification.67  The court held that compliance with 
the AKS was an “implied condition of payment,” and, therefore, when 
the defendants submitted the claims for payment, they made a material 
misrepresentation that such condition had been met.68  The defendant 
knowingly caused the hospital to make a false representation that was 
material to the government’s decision to pay regardless of whether the 
provision was an express condition of payment.69  Pointedly, the relator 
was able to sufficiently allege that the hospital’s and the physician’s 
misrepresentation was material because the court could not conclude, as 
a matter of law, that the noncompliance was incapable of influencing 
Medicare’s decision whether or not to pay the claims.70  The Fourth 
Circuit followed the Blackstone court’s “material to the government’s 
decision to pay” standard.71 
Similar to Mikes, in United States v. Sci. Apps. Int’l Corp., 
noncompliance was not a stated prerequisite to payment.72  Despite the 
condition not being expressly stated, the D.C. Circuit broadly interpreted 
the standard by finding the implied certification claim actionable “even if 
the contract does not specify” that compliance with the contract term is a 
condition of payment.73 
C. Conditions of Participation Position 
The Federal Court of Claims was the first to recognize the false 
 
 66  Id. at 379-80. 
 67  Id. at 385-86. (“Judicially-created categories sometimes can . . . create artificial 
barriers that obscure and distort those requirements. The text of the FCA does not refer to 
‘factually false’ or ‘legally false’ claims, nor does it refer to ‘express certification’ or ‘implied 
certification.’ Indeed, it does not refer to ‘certification’ at all.  In light of this, and our view 
that these categories may do more to obscure than clarify the issues before us, we do not 
employ them here.”). 
 68  Id. at 393-94. 
 69  Id. at 379-80. 
 70  Blackstone Med., Inc., 647 F.3d at 394. 
 71  United States v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628, 637 n.5 (rejecting the defendants’ 
(Triple Canopy) reliance on express conditions of payment standard from the Mikes court). 
 72  United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 73  Id. (“Establish[ing] the existence of a ‘false or fraudulent’ claim on the basis of 
implied certification of a contractual condition, the FCA plaintiff . . . must show that the 
contractor withheld information about its noncompliance with material contractual 
requirements. . . . The “non-compliance with contract terms may give rise to false or 
fraudulent claims, even if the contract does not specify that compliance with the contract term 
is a condition of payment.”) (emphasis added)).  
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implied certification theory in 1994.74  In  Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United 
States, the court held progress payment vouchers submitted by Ab-Tech 
to the Small Business Administration (“SBA”)  for reimbursement were 
fraudulent, because, “by deliberately withholding from SBA knowledge 
of the prohibited contract arrangement with Pyramid, Ab-Tech not only 
dishonored the terms of its agreement with that agency but, more 
importantly, caused the Government to pay out funds in the mistaken 
belief that it was furthering the aims of the 8(a) program.”75  The 
government was “duped by Ab-Tech’s active concealment of a fact vital 
to the integrity of that program” and the noncompliance was material to 
the government payment decision-making process.  The court found this 
to be the “essence of a false claim.”76  But strikingly, the payment 
vouchers “represented an implied certification by Ab-Tech of its 
continuing adherence to the requirements for participation in the 
[minority contractor] program,” and not an expressly stated condition for 
payment.77 
The Eleventh Circuit’s pre-Escobar decision, which greatly 
departed from even the most liberal positions held by the First Circuit, 
D.C. Circuit, and Federal Circuit, applied the theory to violations of 
conditions of participation and sent a signal to manufacturers and 
providers that noncompliance with the conditions of participation in 
federal programs may give rise to an FCA claim—at least in the Eleventh 
Circuit.78  The decision drew strong criticism, as it greatly expanded the 
false implied certification theory and, as a result, burdened the courts.79 
The Sixth Circuit refused to follow the 11th Circuit’s conditions-of-
participation position, and instead followed the Second Circuit’s Mikes 
 
 74  See Martin, supra note 1, at 240. 
 75  Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994). 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. 
 78  McNutt ex rel. United States v. Haleyville Med. Supplies, Inc., 423 F.3d 1256, 1259 
(2005) (“When a violator of government regulations is ineligible to participate in a 
government program and that violator persists in presenting claims for payment that the 
violator knows the government does not owe, that violator is liable, under the Act, for its 
submission of those false claims.”) (emphasis added). 
 79  United States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr. Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1219 
(10th Cir. 2008) (“[I]f merely signing this form converts a condition of participation into a 
condition of payment, then every hospice provider not fully complying with all conditions of 
participation may be held liable under the FCA, thus undermining the distinction between 
conditions of payment and participation, as well as Medicare’s internal administrative 
structure to deal with violations of conditions of participation. To so hold would burden 
federal courts with what should be administrative determinations of whether medical services 
were performed in compliance with Medicare statutes and regulations governing 
participation.”). 
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decision.80  In United States ex rel. Chesbrough v. VPA, the court 
disagreed with relators who alleged that the provider’s radiology studies 
and practices were defective and that the defendant, Visiting Physicians 
Association, P.C., subsequently defrauded the government by submitting 
claims for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement.81  Specifically, the 
relators alleged that the “studies reviewed . . . were of either no diagnostic 
value or limited diagnostic value.”82  The Sixth Circuit held that, because 
the allegations related to the provider’s noncompliance with testing 
standards and not to the prerequisites to payment of claims, it was not 
actionable under the false implied certification theory.83 
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion created even more opportunity for 
varying interpretations of falsity and what it meant to submit a material 
misrepresentation.  This decision made it inevitable that the Supreme 
Court would intervene to resolve the split. 
IV. ESCOBAR AND THE THEORY 
A. Escobar 
Yarushka Rivera was a patient with Arbour Counseling Services, a 
subsidiary of petitioner Universal Health Services, Inc.84  Universal 
Health sought reimbursement using payment codes for specific 
counseling services.85  But, in fact, Arbour had employed approximately 
twenty-three unlicensed staff to provide mental health services and to 
prescribe drugs without supervision.86  Rivera died after an adverse 
reaction to medication prescribed by an unlicensed staff member at 
Arbour.87  Her parents filed a qui tam suit under the implied false 
certification theory of liability, alleging that Universal Health had 
violated the FCA.88  Rivera’s parents alleged Arbour’s noncompliance 
with staff and licensing requirements for those who treated Rivera clearly 
 
 80  United States ex rel. Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 468 (2011) (explaining 
that noncompliance with a regulation constitutes actionable fraud only when compliance is 
a prerequisite to obtaining payment).  Cf. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(holding that implied false certification is appropriately applied only when the underlying 
statute or regulation, upon which the plaintiff relies, expressly states that the provider must 
comply in order to be paid). 
 81  Chesbrough, 655 F.3d at 464. 
 82  Id. at 465. 
 83  Id. at 468. 
 84  Id. at 1993; United States ex rel. Escobar v. Univ. Health Servs., 136 S.Ct. 1989, 1993 
(2016). 
 85  Id. at 1993-94. 
 86  Id. at 1997. 
 87  Id.  
 88  Id.  
DAWKINS 2017 
176 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 42:1 
violated Massachusetts Medicaid regulations.89  They even alleged that 
Universal Health had used National Provider Identification numbers 
matched to specific job titles for their unlicensed staff.90 
The First Circuit held that every submission of a claim implicitly 
represents an agreement to comply with relevant regulations, and “any 
undisclosed violation of a precondition of payment (whether or not 
expressly identified as such) renders a claim ‘false or fraudulent.’”91  The 
court said the regulations themselves proved that “compliance was a 
material condition of payment because the regulations expressly required 
facilities to adequately supervise staff as a condition of payment.”92  But, 
the Supreme Court in Escobar found that the First Circuit erred in 
adopting the government’s expansive view that any statutory, regulatory, 
or contractual violation was material, so long as the defendant knew that 
the government would be entitled to refuse payment if it was aware of the 
violation.93  The Court stated: 
If the Government contracts for health services and adds a 
requirement that contractors buy American-made staplers, 
anyone who submits a claim for those services but fails to 
disclose its use of foreign staplers violates the False Claims 
Act.  To the Government, liability would attach if the 
defendant’s use of foreign staplers would entitle the 
Government not to pay the claim in whole or part—
irrespective of whether the Government routinely pays claims 
despite knowing that foreign staplers were used.  Likewise, if 
the Government required contractors to aver their compliance 
with the entire U. S. Code and Code of Federal Regulations, 
then under this view, failing to mention noncompliance with 
any of those requirements would always be material.  The 
False Claims Act does not adopt such an extraordinarily 
expansive view of liability.94 
The Supreme Court did, however, uphold the implied false 
certification theory, finding that it can be a basis for liability under the 
FCA when a contractor makes “specific representations about the goods 
or services provided” and when a “failure to disclose noncompliance with 
material statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirements makes those 
representations misleading half-truths.”95  The Court recognized that the 
subjective standard is “demanding” of the lower courts, requiring them to 
ask the fact-finder to determine if the government would have paid the 
claim if it was aware of the contractor’s noncompliance, and whether the 
 
 89  Id. at 1997-98. 
 90  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1994. 
 91  Id. at 1993. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. at 2004.  
 94  Id. at 2004 
 95  Id. at 2001. 
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contractor itself was aware that its noncompliance was material to the 
government’s decision in the payment-making process.96 
The contractor has a duty to disclose the violation.97  Defendants 
Universal Health, argued that the submission of a claim involves no 
representations, and that the “nondisclosure of legal violations is not 
actionable absent a special “duty of reasonable care to disclose the matter 
in question.”98  The Supreme Court disagreed.  It reasoned that when 
Universal Health used payment codes that did not match the 
corresponding counseling services actually provided, or the correct 
credentialing held by the mental health facility staff, this constituted a 
misrepresentation to which the theory may apply.99  In recognizing that 
the standard would be “rigorous” and “demanding,” plaintiffs were put 
on notice that material misrepresentation will be adjudicated on a case-
by-case basis.100  It is not enough to establish materiality by showing that 
the government would have had the option of denying payment for the 
claim had it known of the noncompliance.101 
The Court remanded the case for a determination on whether the 
mental health facility requirements were “so central” to Medicaid that, 
had they known of the violation, they would not have paid for their 
services.102  Given its prior position on the implied false certification 
theory, it is no surprise that, on remand, the First Circuit had little trouble 
holding that Universal Health Services’ noncompliance was sufficiently 
material to survive UHS’s motion to dismiss.103  
B. The Materiality Factors 
The Escobar Court utilized the “expressly stated condition” test 
from the Second Circuit to establish materiality, but ultimately was not 
persuaded.104  The Court found that the FCA did not textually support the 
 
 96  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003. 
 97  Id. at 2000 (“Likewise, an applicant for an adjunct position at a local college makes 
an actionable misrepresentation when his resume lists prior jobs and then retirement, but fails 
to disclose that his ‘retirement’ was a prison stint for perpetrating a $12 million bank fraud.”) 
(citing Sarvis v. Vermont State Colleges, 172 Vt. 76, 78, 80-82 (2001)). 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. at 2000-01. 
 100  Id. at 2002. 
 101  Id. at 2003. 
 102  The complaint only alleged that the government would not have paid Defendants’ 
claims had they known of Defendants’ fraudulent conduct.  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 at 2004.  
The Court explained that the government needed to detail why it would have denied payment.  
Id.  
 103  U.S. ex rel. Escobar v. Univ. Health Servs., 842 F.3d 103, 111 (1st Cir. 2016). 
 104  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996 (“What matters is not the label that the Government 
attaches to a requirement, but whether the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that 
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express-condition designation.105  Also, the Court did not consider the 
limitation a part of the Common Law meaning of fraud.106  Instead, the 
Court used the First Circuit’s reading of the Act by “conclud[ing] that the 
Act [did] not impose this limit on liability.”107  Identifying a provision as 
a condition of payment is relevant, but not automatically dispositive of 
materiality.108 
Under Escobar, the government and relators must meet both the 
objective and subjective standards when judging if a misrepresentation 
was material to the decision to its pay.109  Evidence that shows that a 
defendant knows that the government routinely denies payment based on 
noncompliance with the particular requirement can be used to establish 
subjective materiality.110 
Additionally, the “government knowledge defense” can be 
employed by defendants, which may be crucial to the materiality bar if 
used in a case where the government pays a particular claim when it 
knows that certain requirements were violated.111  The defense may also 
be useful if the government regularly pays a particular type of claim 
despite actual knowledge that a requirement was violated and “has 
signaled no change in position.”112  In that case, the government would 
need to show that, while it may have previously paid for a particular type 
of claim, it stopped payment of such claims.113 
Not only will materiality depend on subjective inquiries, but also an 
objective test that examines if a reasonable actor in the government’s 
position would consider the representation important in the decision-
making process, or if the defendant knew the government would consider 
the representation significant in deciding whether to reimburse, even if a 
reasonable person would not consider it important.114  Lastly, if the 
 
the defendant knows is material to the Government’s payment decision.”). 
 105  Id. at 2001. 
 106  Id.  
 107  Id. 
 108  Id. at 2003. 
 109  Id. at 2002-03. 
 110 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003. 
 111  Id. at 2003. 
 112  Id. at 2003-2004.  In the post-Escobar case, United States ex rel. McBride v. 
Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2017), the DCAA investigated the relators’ 
allegations and continued to pay the defendants for their services and the court, therefore, 
determined that the claims were not material to the government. 
 113  Id. at 2003-04 (“[I]f the Government regularly pays a particular type of claim in full 
despite actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated, and has signaled no change 
in position, that is strong evidence that the requirements are not material.”). 
 114  Id. at 2002-03 (“‘[If] a reasonable man would attach importance to [it] in determining 
his choice of action in the transaction’; or (2) if the defendant knew or had reason to know 
DAWKINS 2017 
2017] NOT SO FAST 179 
misrepresentation goes to the “essence of the bargain,” then this factor 
can be considered material to the payment decision.115  A 
misrepresentation about the requirement must be material to the 
government’s payment decision in order to be actionable.116  Minor 
infractions in noncompliance with statutory, regulatory, or contractual 
requirements will not be considered material.117 
Escobar rejected the expressly stated condition standard articulated 
in Mikes.118  In Mikes, even though the court “agree[d] that the defendants 
certified they would comply with the terms on the form and that such 
compliance was a precondition of governmental payment,” it still denied 
the relator’s claims.119  The court examined two different sections of the 
Medicare statute and found that the defendants certified compliance with 
the section that was a precondition of governmental payment, but their 
performance of spirometry test was governed by a separate Medicare 
section and this one, the one Mikes most heavily relied upon, was not an 
explicitly stated condition of payment.120  Escobar rejected such labeling 
as dispositive.121 
V. THE THEORY AFTER ESCOBAR 
In the post-Escobar era, the government has contended that Escobar 
did not overturn the First and Ninth Circuits’ decisions.122  Citing the 
language of the FCA, the government asserts that Escobar ”reaffirmed” 
FCA jurisprudence that described “material” as “having a natural 
tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or 
receipt of money or property” and that “materiality is a flexible standard 
that can be met in a variety of circumstances.”123  Lower courts have 
 
that the recipient of the representation attaches importance to the specific matter ‘in 
determining his choice of action,’ even though a reasonable person would not.”) (citing the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §538, at 80). 
 115 Id. at 2003 n.5. 
 116  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2003.  
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. at 1996. 
 119  Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 698 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 120  Id. at 699. 
 121 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002. 
 122  John Bentivoglio et al., Escobar and the Implied Certification Theory: Initial Cases 
Raise the Bar on Materiality in False Claims Act Litigation, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, 
MEAGHER & FLOM (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/11/ 
emescobarem-and-the-implied-certification-theory-i. 
 123  Laurence Freedman, Samantha Kingsbury, & Karen Lovitch, Supreme Court Decision 
on FCA Issues Leads to Brawl in Lower Courts, MARTINDALE (Jan. 25, 2017), 
http://www.martindale.com/health-care-law/article_Mintz-Levin-Cohn-Ferris-Glovsky-Pope 
o-PC_2240026.htm. 
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started to grapple with the materiality standard of Escobar.  It is not 
surprising that there is no clear-cut answer as to what counts as a material 
misrepresentation under the FCA.  Escobar should have done more to 
delineate what is needed to show that the misrepresentation would have 
affected the government’s decision to pay.124 
A.  The Winner Is . . . 
While Escobar has been seen as a win for the government and 
relators, the ruling’s limitations created substantial hurdles for the 
government and relators to overcome and left defendants exposed to 
expansive discovery if the government and relators can get past the 
pleading stage.  The materiality standard gained more teeth after Escobar 
as a result of the materiality factors.  The “more rigorous materiality 
analysis” no longer considers whether a condition is expressly stated as 
dispositive; this announcement by the Court is an advantage for relators 
during the initial stages of a case.  The Court emphasized that a complaint 
must allege “with plausibility and particularity” that the noncompliance 
was material to the government’s decision to pay.125  Before Escobar, 
materiality was rarely decided at the pleading stage.126  If a qui tam relator 
or the government alleges in their complaint information and belief that 
a material condition was in fact violated; that the condition, whether 
expressly stated or not, was the sine qua non of the decision payment 
process; or if the relator can show information of where the payment has 
been denied in similar circumstances, then discovery will ensue.  These 
are all factors that, before Escobar, were not clearly available to relators 
in showing materiality during the pleading stage. 
It is not exactly clear who the winner is in Escobar.  On one hand, 
the court rejected the qui tam relators’ and the government’s assertion, 
often used in false implied certification theory cases, that any claim for 
payment is material so long as the defendant knows that the government 
would be entitled to refuse payment if it was aware of the violation.127  
 
 124  See generally Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, Interpretation, and the 
Quest for Fraud that ‘Counts’ under the False Claims Act, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1811. 
 125  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2004 n.6; see also John Ruskusky & Emily Harlan, Materiality 
Matters: The First Post-Escobar Decisions, LAW360 (Jul. 18, 2016, 5:50 PM), https://www. 
law360.com/articles/818294/materiality-matters-the-first-post-escobar-decisions (making 
the argument that defendants have an advantage post-Escobar at pleading stage because 
several post-Escobar decisions have dismissed relators claims for failing to identify with 
sufficient particularity material falsehoods in the defendants claims). 
 126  Tara Lee, Could ‘Escobar’ Prove to Be This Term’s Most Expensive Case?; Opinion: 
The U.S. Supreme Court OK’d Broad Parameters for Fraud Deserving of Penalties., NAT’L 
L. J. (July. 11, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202762169591/Could-
Escobar-Prove-to-Be-This-Terms-Most-Expensive-Case?slreturn=20170919183310.  
 127  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995. 
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And yet, the decision was a total defeat for Universal Health, because the 
Court held that, under certain circumstances, representations that result 
in half-truths can be actionable misrepresentations.128  The Court 
emphasized that the FCA cases should not be used to settle ordinary 
contract disputes.129  The Court was concerned that the FCA would be 
used as an avenue for the sort of run-of-the-mill cases that attempt to 
enforce noncompliance with regulations that have little to do with 
specific misrepresentations about the goods or services provided and 
more to do with contract disputes that have little effect on the 
government’s decision to confer the benefit.130 
Well before Escobar, critics opposed the false implied certification 
theory because they felt that relators and the government would use it as 
a bludgeon to exact harsh penalties for noncompliance with a wide range 
of regulations and contractual requirements instead of using the theory 
only for targeting fraud.131  Nevertheless, after Escobar, the health care 
industry still has many of the same concerns, because the lower courts 
still differ in their application of the materiality standard.132 
B. Uphill Battle for Relators 
After Escobar, courts are now more willing to consider materiality 
at the pleading stage.133  The court in United States ex rel. Lee v. Northern 
Adult Daily Health Care Center granted, in part, a motion to dismiss in 
one of the first federal court cases to apply the materiality standard 
announced by Escobar.  In doing so, it underscored the difficulty relators 
face in proving materiality.  The relators failed to show how the 
defendants’ noncompliance with Medicare regulations, (billing worthless 
claims), would have affected the government’s decision to pay.134  The 
 
 128  Id. at 2000. 
 129  Id. at 2003 (explaining that FCA cases should not be an “all-purpose garden-variety 
tool to punish government contractors for contractual disputes).  
 130  Id.  
 131  Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 699 (2d Cir. 2001) (“the False Claims Act was not 
designed for use as a blunt instrument to enforce compliance with all medical regulations”). 
  132  Evan Sweeney, After Implied Cert Ruling, Courts Will Focus on ‘Materiality’, FIERCE 
HEALTHCARE (Jun. 21, 2016), http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/antifraud/following-implied-
certification-ruling-courts-will-focus-materiality (“[W]histleblowers [will have] a stronger 
blueprint for successful FCA claims, and gives the government a reason to ‘assert their 
resources’ in FCA cases in which certain regulations are material to medical payments.”). 
 133  Bradley D. Wine et al., Courts Are Taking Materiality Seriously Post-Escobar, 
LAW360, (Sept. 20, 2016, 12:42 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/838782/courts-are-
taking-materiality-seriously-post-escobar. 
 134  United States v. N. Adult Daily Health Care Ctr., 205 F. Supp. 3d 276, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 
2016) (“[B]ecause Relators have not alleged that noncompliance with [federal] regulations 
listed in the Amended Complaint would have influenced the government’s decision to 
reimburse Northern Adult, Relators have not stated a claim under an implied false certification 
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relator’s claims, which lacked particularity with regard to materiality, 
would have progressed under Mikes in the Second Circuit, but not after 
Escobar.135 
However, Relators do not allege, as they are now required to 
do under Universal Health, that Northern Adult’s 
misrepresentations were material and that the government 
would have refused reimbursement had it known of Northern 
Adult’s noncompliance with Title VI and the cited DOH 
regulations.  Instead, Relators argue that Northern Adult 
certified its compliance with regulations on which the 
government conditioned Medicaid reimbursement.  While 
Relators’ argument may have sufficed to support an implied 
false certification claim under the standard in Mikes, 
it no longer suffices under the standard in Universal 
Health.136 
The Court in Escobar reemphasized that statutory, regulatory, and 
contractual requirements “are not automatically material, even if they are 
labeled conditions of payment.”137  Instead it regarded expressly stated 
conditions of payment as factors in determining materiality.138  If the 
relators amend their complaint, given that they did not have the benefit 
of having the Escobar decision before them when they filed, they might 
be able to satisfy Escobar’s other condition—that the defendant’s failure 
to disclose noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory, or 
contractual requirements makes the specific representations misleading 
half-truths.139 
i. Escobar’s Two-Part Test and Its First Condition 
District courts are already split on whether fulfillment of the two-
part test announced in Escobar is the only basis for the theory to attach.  
One of the two conditions of Escobar is that the claim for payment must 
make specific representations about the goods or services provided.140  
One court has already rejected the notion that “the two conditions [were] 
intended to describe the outer reaches of FCA liability: the Court stated 
that liability could be found “at least” where these conditions were 
satisfied.141  Another court opined that the Escobar Court’s “use of ‘at 
least’ indicated that it need not decide whether the implied false 
certification theory was viable in all cases, because the particular claim 
 
theory of liability.”). 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. 
 137  Universal Health Servs. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2001 (2016). 
 138  Id. 
 139  N. Adult Daily Health Care Ctr., 205 F. Supp. 3d at 295.  
 140  Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001. 
 141  United States v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1044-45 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
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before it contained ‘specific representations’ that were ‘misleading half-
truths.’”142  With some courts finding the two-part test as an “exclusive 
means of establishing implied certification liability,” and other courts and 
the DOJ insisting that liability can attach without satisfying the first part 
of the test, whether or not defendants will find a favorable outcome 
depends on where the case is filed.  For this reason, it seems Escobar 
changed very little for defendants and the risk faced depending on the 
circuit. 
C. Equally Uphill Battle for Defendants 
i. Escobar’s Second Condition 
The concern that there is an uphill battle for false-implied-
certification-case defendants is a legitimate one, as two government 
contractors recently failed to survive a motion to dismiss with the 
Department of Energy.143  The second Escobar condition was seen in 
Williams v. City of Brockton “when the party’s failure to disclose 
noncompliance with material statutory, regulatory or contractual 
requirements [amounted] to a misleading half-truth.”144  The court drew 
direct parallels to Escobar in the misrepresentation of Brockton Police 
Department’s compliance with civil rights and anti-discrimination laws 
in order to obtain DOJ funding.145  The court cited to Escobar in 
concluding that the police department’s misrepresentation was “neither 
minor nor insubstantial.”146  Specifically, on the issue of materiality of 
Defendants’ alleged non-compliance with the non-supplanting 
requirements, the relator was unable to point to any statutes that underlie 
those requirements.147  But, he was able to allege that the government has, 
on occasion, barred enforcement agencies from receiving grants because 
those agencies violated the non-supplanting requirements.148  Therefore, 
the alleged conduct was sufficient to show that “the Government 
 
 142  Rose v. Stephens Inst., No. 09-cv-05966-PJH, 2016 WL 6393513, at * 5 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 28, 2016). 
 143  United States v. Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC, No. 1:16-cv-00825-JMC, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168067, at *88  (D.S.C Dec. 6, 2016); see also Johnson et al. v. 
Golden Gate National Senior Care L.L.C., 223 F. Supp. 3d 882, 894 (D. Minn. 2016) (“[But] 
the distinction between conditions of payment and conditions of participation are not 
dispositive of the FCA’s materiality requirement [and a] fact-intensive inquiry is needed 
before determining materiality.”). 
 144  United States ex. rel Williams v. City of Brockton, No. 12-cv-12193-IT, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 178032, at * 21 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 2016) (quoting Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001).  
 145  Id. at *13.   
 146  Id. at *20.   
 147  Id.   
 148  Id. 
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consistently refuse[d] to pay claims in the mine run of cases based on 
noncompliance” with the non-supplanting requirements.149  Additionally, 
as seen in Escobar, the relator relied on the Escobarian “essence of the 
bargain”  factor stating the grantee’s compliance with federal civil rights 
laws “go[es] to the very essence of the bargain” of the government’s 
decision to provide funding.150  The court agreed, stating the “centrality 
of racially-neutral and non-discriminatory policing to the COPS program 
is strong evidence that a grantee’s non-compliance would have the 
tendency to influence the DOJ’s decision to award the grant.”151 
The court denied pharmaceutical giant Celgene’s summary 
judgment motion against the relator’s claims that Celgene was involved 
in an unlawful campaign to promote off-label promotion of two of its 
drugs and payment of illegal kickbacks to physicians.152  The DOJ argued 
that “the fact that the government may continue to pay even after 
discovering wrongdoing does not establish a lack of materiality[;] [t]he 
government may wish to avoid further cost or simply wish to afford an 
accused party the opportunity to be heard in court.”153 
Notwithstanding the DOJ’s arguments, the U.S. District Court for 
the Central District of California found that genuine dispute of material 
fact existed as to whether Celgene’s claims were material to Medicare 
and the government’s payment decision-making process.154  Specifically, 
the court held that even if CMS knew that the claims were not for 
prescription drugs covered by Medicare Part D, and therefore failed to 
meet the medical acceptance requirement, it does not mean that CMS had 
“actual knowledge” that the claims were non-compliant and proceeded to 
reimburse the claims.155  An important takeaway from Escobar is the 
focus on the government’s knowledge of noncompliance and how this 
relates to materiality. 
The Eighth Circuit issued one of the first post-Escobar opinions to 
deal with materiality in United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston 
Educational.156  The relators, former employees, claimed that Heritage, a 
for-profit college, signed a Program Participation Agreement (“PPA”) 
with the Department of Education (“DOE”) to receive funds under Title 
 
 149  Id. at *20. 
 150  City of Brockton, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178032, at *18.   
 151  Id.   
 152  United States v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 153  Id. 
 154  Id at 1037.  
 155  Id.  
 156  U.S. ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 840 F.3d 494 (8th Cir. 2016).   
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IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965.157  Once the PPA was in place, 
the relators alleged that Heritage employees falsified grades and 
attendance records without the instructors’ consent to induce the DOE to 
provide funds.158  The district court granted summary judgment on all 
claims and held that Heritage did not promise to keep perfect records.159  
Further, it found that “any promise was not material to the disbursement 
of funds.”160  The Eighth Circuit found that the lower court erred in 
granting summary judgment because “a reasonable jury could find that 
the college knew it had to keep accurate grade and attendance records and 
intended not to do so.”  Additionally, the college’s promise to keep 
adequate records was material to the government’s disbursement 
decisions because “the college could not have executed the Program 
Participation Agreement (PPA) with the DOE without stating it would 
maintain adequate records and, without the PPA, the college could not 
have received any Title IV funds.”161  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and vacated the Eighth Circuit’s decision with orders to 
reexamine its prior holding in light of Escobar, which had been decided 
after the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s decision.  On remand, 
the Eighth Circuit once again reversed the grant of summary judgment, 
as there was a triable question of fact and a legitimate dispute about 
whether Heritage intended to falsify student grades and break its promise 
to keep accurate records under the PPA.162  Again, the court found that 
the recordkeeping requirement was material because it was a condition 
of payment and, even though such a label is not dispositive, it is an 
Escobar factor nonetheless.163  Specifically, in keeping with Escobar, the 
Eighth Circuit reiterated that a false statement is material if a reasonable 
person would likely attach importance to it, or the defendant knew or 
should have known that the government would attach importance to it.164 
The court rightfully found that Heritage’s promise was material 
 
 157  Id. at 498.   
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. at 499.   
 160  Id. 
 161  United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 784 F.3d 1198, 2016 (8th Cir. 2015), 
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2505 (2016). 
 162  U.S. ex rel. Miller, 840 F.3d at 503. 
 163  Id. at 504 (“In order to be for Title IV an institution ‘shall’ enter into a PPA that ‘shall 
condition the initial and continuing eligibility of an institution to participate in a 
program upon compliance with’ certain requirements, including that the ‘institution will 
establish and maintain such administrative and fiscal procedures and records as may be 
necessary to ensure proper and efficient administration of funds.’”) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 
1094(a)) (emphasis added). 
 164  Id. at 503 (reiterating Escobar’s materiality standard); see also Universal Health Servs. 
v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016).  
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because a reasonable person would attach significant importance to a 
promise to keep records that are “necessary to ensure funds go where they 
are supposed to go.”165  The recordkeeping requirement was found as a 
condition of payment in three different sources of law: statute, regulation, 
and the PPA signed by Heritage.  Lastly, and most notably in light of the 
Escobar factors, the court said the “government’s acts confirm that it 
cares about the promise at issue” and relies on the school to keep accurate 
records to monitor regulatory compliance.166  Pointedly, and perhaps 
most striking of the relators’ claims in light of Escobar, is that the DOE 
sometimes “terminates otherwise eligible institutions for falsifying 
student attendance and grade records.”167  Therefore, had the government 
known of the fraudulent recordkeeping practices at Heritage, given the 
importance the government attaches to maintaining accurate records as 
shown in Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 and the PPA itself, 
the government would have terminated funding.168 
D.  Still Good Law? 
During the pre-Escobar era, defendants in civil cases within the 
Fourth Circuit, D.C. Circuit, or First Circuit faced more risk where the 
theory was applied broadly.  According to the government, those cases 
are still good law.  In United States ex rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co, the 
DOJ asserted in its Statement of Interest that the Supreme Court “left 
intact the Ninth Circuit’s prior case law addressing this very question” of 
implied certification liability.169  Conversely, some courts have already 
asserted that Escobar may overturn long-standing precedent.  Recently, 
for example, the court in Rose v. Stephens Institute found that Escobar 
did not alter Ninth Circuit materiality precedent set forth in United States 
ex rel. Hendow v. University of Phoenix.170  The defendant 
in Hendow argued that the alleged noncompliance was a condition of 
participation and not a condition of payment and, therefore, was not 
material and could not form a basis for an FCA claim under Mikes.171  
The court disagreed and reasoned that the participation-payment 
 
 165  U.S. ex rel. Miller, 840 F.3d at 504. 
 166  Id. 
 167  Id. at 505. 
 168  Id. 
 169  Paul F. Khoury, Ralph J. Caccia, & Shane B. Kelly, Government Contractors Deal 
with the Uncertain Shadow of Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States Ex Rel. 
Escobar, 52-SPG PROCUREMENT LAWYER 12, 12-13 (2017) (stating that the Supreme Court 
left Ninth Circuit’s prior case law addressing the very question of implied certification 
liability intact). 
 170  Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1173 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 171  Id. at 1176. 
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differentiation found in Mikes was limited to the Medicare context and 
that, “[i]n the context of Title IV and the Higher Education Act, if we 
held that conditions of participation were not conditions of payment there 
would be no conditions of payment at all.”172  Further, the court found 
that precedent in the Ninth Circuit, following Ebeid v. Lungwitz, did not 
contain “the expressly stated conditions” limitation.173 
Even still, the Rose court certified three questions of law for 
interlocutory appeal to decide whether the Ninth Circuit’s precedent was 
still good law because “[the] case [was] a strong vehicle for the Ninth 
Circuit to consider its materiality law in light of Escobar, as the facts are 
substantially similar to those in Hendow.”174  Since the reasoning 
of Hendow relied on the fact that Title IV funds are “explicitly 
conditioned,” and Escobar made clear that labels are not dispositive, the 
court asked “does Hendow’s holding that the ICB is material under the 
FCA remain good law after Escobar?”175  The Rose court noted that in 
certifying the questions it would decide amongst a split in the courts on 
whether the two-part test must always be satisfied for implied false 
certification liability under the FCA, or the Ninth Circuit Ebeid’s test for 
implied false certification remained good law.176 
E.  The Benefit of Hindsight – Pre-Escobar Cases Now 
The debate over whether a court should look to the condition of 
participation standard used in Ab-Tech and again by the Eleventh Circuit, 
or the condition of payment standard in Mikes did not amount to “a 
distinction without a difference.”177  Defendants were treated more 
favorably in the Second Circuit and the circuits that followed its standard.  
The reason why the Hendow court stated that the distinction may amount 
 
 172  Id.  
 173  Id. 
 174  But see Order Granting in Part Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal at 4-
6, United States ex rel. Rose v. Stephens Inst. d/b/a Acad. of Art Univ., No. 4:09-cv-05966-
PJH (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2016) (ECF No. 219). 
 175  Rose v. Stephens Inst., No. 09-cv-05966-PJH, 2016 WL 6393513, at * 12 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 28, 2016); see also United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 
1175 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 176  Rose, 2016 WL 6393513, at *10. 
 177  Brief for the Taxpayers against Fraud Education Fund As Amici Curiae Supporting 
Appellants and Reversal  
at 10, United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., 842 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2016) 
(No. 14-1423) (citing U.S. ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 
2006)); see also U.S. ex rel. Conner v. Salina Reg’l Health Ctr., Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1222 
(10th Cir. 2008) (explaining that some regulations or statutes may be so integral to the 
government’s payment decision as to make any divide between conditions of participation 
and conditions of payment a “distinction without a difference”)). 
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to “distinction without a difference” is because some regulations or 
statutes may be so integral to the government’s payment decision as to 
make any divide between conditions of participation and conditions of 
payment necessarily intertwined. 
To see why this is so, one only need look at the University’s 
semantic argument, in which it claims that for a condition of 
participation, an institution says it ‘“will” comply’ with 
various statutes and regulations, but for a condition of 
payment, an institution says that it ‘has complied.’  This 
grammatical haggling is unmoored in the law, and it is 
undercut by the Program Participation Agreement itself. In 
the section that the University concedes contains conditions 
of payment—the section entitled ‘Certifications Required 
From Institutions’—the University agrees that it ‘will’ or 
‘shall’ comply with various regulations no less than six times.  
Under the University’s logic, these future-tense assertions 
could not be conditions of payment, and yet it concedes that 
they are.  Its concession is correct; these, and all other 
promises to comply with the Program Participation 
Agreement, are conditions of payment.  These conditions are 
also ‘prerequisites,’ and ‘the sine qua non’ of federal funding, 
for one basic reason: if the University had not agreed to 
comply with them, it would not have gotten paid.178 
Today, after Escobar, Hendow would have been decided the same 
because the defendant’s compliance goes to the “essence of the bargain.” 
The Escobar Court’s treatment of Mikes and the “expressly stated 
conditions” standard helps relators and the government, as the absence of 
an expressly stated condition does not necessarily prove that the condition 
is not material.  Mikes, perhaps, would have been decided differently after 
Escobar, if Mikes could have shown that the qualitative standard of care 
mandate of the Social Security Act was essential to the bargain in 
receiving reimbursement.  The Mikes Court was more concerned with 
preventing the use of the theory where the “quality of care failed to meet 
medical standards[,] [which] would promote federalization of medical 
malpractice.”179  Had Mikes been able to prove that the defendants’ 
performance of spirometry was unnecessary, she would have succeeded 
because, pursuant to § 1395(y)(a)(1)(A), the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services prohibits “payment of benefits for any experimental, 
investigational, or unproven treatment or diagnostic method not yet 
generally accepted in the medical profession.”  The correlation between 
the medically necessary spirometry tests and this Medicare regulation are 
the Escobarian “sine qua non” of government payment—not the quality 
of the spirometry tests. 
Without Escobar, in the Second Circuit and the circuits that 
 
 178  Hendow, 461 F.3d at 1176. 
 179  Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 700 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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followed Mikes, a contractor could have submitted a claim for payment 
that is related to the sine qua non of government payment but, because 
the condition was not an expressly stated condition of payment, liability 
did not attach.  The government was duped and paid for a fraudulent 
claim, albeit not an expressly stated condition.  This runs counter to 
Congressional intent, in particular after the False Claims Amendments 
Act of 1986.180 
Out of all of the factors the Escobar Court urged the lower courts to 
look at in finding materiality, evidence that the misrepresentation goes to 
the “essence of the bargain” should be given the most weight.  Escobar’s 
“very essence of the bargain” factor was seen in the Ninth Circuit 
recently.181  Relators, former employees, Health Choice Arizona, a 
subsidiary of IASIS Healthcare LLC, a prepaid Medicaid-managed health 
plan that contracts with Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System, 
succeeded in showing the materiality of an implied false certification 
claim.182  The relators were able to establish materiality at the pleading 
stage because the contractual requirements that the plan allegedly failed 
to meet—such as “all funds be both medically necessary and cost-
effective—were the sine qua non of government payment.183  This 
requirement was absolutely necessary for the relationship between the 
government and its decision to pay and the health care providers.184  This 
Escobarian factor is the strongest of all the factors in proving materiality. 
Evidence that shows that a defendant knows that the government 
routinely denies payment based on noncompliance with the particular 
requirement in addition to the government knowledge bar, should not be 
given as much weight as the others, because it puts an enormous burden 
on the government to “change its position” after knowledge of 
noncompliance.  The government may have a particular reason for 
 
 180  S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5269 
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continuing payment such as public health or safety.185  This should not 
contradict materiality.  It should not refute noncompliance and fraud 
committed by the contractor. 
The Escobar court supports the original intent of the FCA to combat 
knowing intent to commit fraud and not minor or technical violations of 
conditions of participation such as not meeting the adequate standard of 
care.  Most striking about the post-Escobar landscape is the idea that the 
government considers Escobar a victory.  Yet, industry stakeholders hope 
that the materiality standard will be a difficult bar for whistleblowers and 
the government to meet.  The different perspectives on Escobar’s 
consequences will likely dissipate once a trend develops in determining 
what kinds of misrepresentations likely influenced the payment-making 
process of the government. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A holistic approach to finding materiality is the correct one.  
Escobar’s call for a demanding, fact-intensive inquiry into whether a 
contractor’s misrepresentation actually affected or likely would have 
affected the government’s decision to pay is well balanced.  It does not 
rush to impose dispositive labels as seen in Mikes, or cast a wide net of 
liability around standard of care violations.  It seems completely fair to 
require relators to not only show that the government would have had the 
option of denying payment had it known of the noncompliance, but also 
show why the government would have denied payment.  That said, 
contractors have been put on notice that, while it is not so easy to prove 
materiality, the theory is certainly alive. 
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